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GENDER  EFFECTS ON AGGREGATE SAVING: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
  
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the hypothesis that shifts in women’s relative income, which 
affects their bargaining power in the household, have discernible effects on aggregate saving due 
to differing saving propensities by gender. An analytical framework for pooled and non-pooled 
savings households is developed to examine why women and men’s saving propensities may 
differ and how a change in women’s wage earnings relative to men’s influences household 
savings. An empirical analysis is conducted using panel data for a set of 20 semi-industrialized 
economies, covering the period 1975-95. The results indicate that as some measures of women’s 
discretionary income and bargaining power increase, aggregate saving rates rise, implying a 
significant effect of gender on aggregate savings. These findings demonstrate the importance of 
understanding gender relations at the household level in planning for savings mobilization and in 
the formulation of financial and investment policies. 
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DOES GENDER HAVE ANY EFFECT ON AGGREGATE SAVING?: 
 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
I. Introduction 
Aggregate saving is an important source of funds for domestic investment and economic 
growth and thus the question of what determines its level and rate remains a crucial research and 
policy agenda. Moreover, in the face of volatile flows of external finance, domestic saving has 
become even more critical for economic development. In particular, the recent financial turmoil 
in developing countries, brought about by rapid cross-border movements of capital, has led many 
countries to seriously consider a larger role for domestic saving (excluding net factor income 
from abroad) as a source of investment funds.1 Likewise, savings at the household level are 
important for the welfare of family members in the course of economic development as a means 
to smooth income, to fund education, for old age support when members become non-earners, 
and to leave as bequests to children. 
In recent years, the debate on the determinants of aggregate saving has shifted from a 
focus on Keynesian capacity-to-save factors to the question of interest rate sensitivity of saving 
as well as the influence of age structure of the population.2 In addition, the possible effects of 
government policies such as taxation and social welfare policies have been examined.3  
                                                           
1 Even before the recent turmoil in financial markets and despite liberalization of international financial 
flows, there was evidence of a correlation between investment and domestic saving rates  (Carroll and Weil 1993; 
Feldstein and Bacchetta 1991; Paxson 1995). 
2 On the effect of interest rates on saving, see, for example, Boskin (1978), de Melo and Tybout (1986), 
Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), Fry (1978, 1984, 1996), Fry and Mason (1982), Giovannini (1985), Gupta (1987), 
and Modigliani (1986). For a review of the literature on the influence of age structure on savings, see Aghevli, 
Boughton, Montiel, Villanueva, and Woglom (1990), and Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1995). 
3 The literature on this subject has been surveyed by Smith (1990). Many countries tax income from saving 
differently than income from labor and therefore detailed knowledge of the country’s tax code is required to assess 
whether such taxation policy is important in explaining variation in savings rate. Since these data and those 
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One area that requires further examination is the role that gender relations play in 
influencing aggregate saving. A small but growing body of literature strongly suggests there are 
gender differences in saving decisions and in risk attitude, at least in some developed countries.4 
This study contributes to that literature by investigating the role of gender in influencing 
aggregate saving in semi-industrialized economies. Given their divergent social and economic 
circumstances within and outside the household, women and men may have differing 
propensities to save at the household level. If so, shifts in women’s relative bargaining power are 
likely to affect household saving rates, and by extension, domestic saving rates. 
In this paper, we first explore the mechanisms through which gender is likely to affect 
saving rates. The factors that affect women’s and men’s propensity to save may be contradictory 
in their effect. For instance, women’s  care responsibilities and role in household management 
may lead to more consumption spending and thus less saving. On the other hand, this 
responsibility may lead women to save more than men for precautionary reasons, due to a 
stronger perception of the need to smooth family consumption. As a result of these contradictory 
forces, it is difficult to make predictions based on a priori reasoning about gender differences in 
saving behavior.   
Following the theoretical discussion, we present analytical frameworks for exploring the 
determinants of both pooled and non-pooled savings at the household level. The models 
highlight the effect of gender-related variables on household saving decisions. Based on these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pertaining to government budget policies are difficult to obtain, these issues are not considered in our empirical 
analysis. 
 4  See, for example, Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996), Bajtelsmit and Van Derhei (1997), Sunden and Surette 
(1998), Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1996), and Hungerford (1999). 
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models, we derive and test an empirical model of aggregate saving that incorporates gender 
variables, and controls for a variety of well-established economic, demographic and financial 
variables. While this paper explores the potential effect of gender relations on saving at the 
household level, household saving data are unavailable for many countries. Hence the 
examination of household saving behavior in this analysis is done indirectly through domestic 
saving which is comprised of household, business, and government saving.5 We find strong 
evidence of gender effects on aggregate saving, a result that underscores the importance of 
understanding gender relations in planning for domestic resource mobilization and in the 
formulation of financial and investment policies.   
II. Gender and Aggregate Saving 
 The extensive literature on determinants of  domestic  saving suggests a variety of 
motives for saving by households, firms, and government. These motives point to a number of 
key variables that affect the aggregate saving rate which, for ease, can be grouped into those that 
affect the capacity of agents to save and those that affect their willingness to save. These include 
the level of per capita income, growth rate of GDP, interest rate, prevalence of financial 
institutions and the range of availability of financial assets, inflation rate, government taxation 
and savings and terms of trade. That literature, which we do not review here, is briefly 
summarized in Appendix A. We simply note here that in our empirical analysis that evaluates the 
effects of gender on saving, we draw from the standard models to develop a set of control 
variables.   
Of particular interest, when considering the effects of gender on saving, is the literature 
                                                           
5  Note that domestic saving excludes net factor incomes from abroad. 
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on the determinants of household saving. In most aggregate-level studies, the theoretical 
relationship between saving and key determinants has been attributed to the life cycle 
hypothesis, interest rate theory, models of strategic bequest and intergenerational transfers, and 
household models of consumption smoothing. Typically, theories assume either the 
(independent) individual or the household as the unit of consumption-saving decision, 
abstracting from any consideration of gender differences in needs or motives to save. Neither has 
prior research explored the nature of intra-household relations that may influence the household 
saving rate.  
If gender influences household saving behavior, by implication, there may be important 
macroeconomic effects of changes in gender relations. In this section, we explore the potential 
link between gender and household saving, and by extension, aggregate saving. 
In considering the role that gender relations play in determining aggregate saving, we 
take the developing country context, which differs in important ways from that of industrialized 
economies. Households in developing countries on average are poorer and income is likely to be 
less stable, so that the allocation of income over time faces severe competing pressures that 
differ in intensity from those in developed economies. Access to financial institutions and the 
availability of financial instruments are more uneven in developing economies, and this also may 
affect saving rates. Further, developing countries tend to have shallow social safety nets. This 
suggests that families must rely to a greater extent on household-level savings and investments in 
kinship networks as part of their consumption smoothing strategy. 
  A. Household Decision-Making 
Research on household saving generally makes the assumption of either an independent 
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individual or a unitary household that seeks to meet several goals: (1) to provide resources for 
retirement and bequests; (2) to finance expected large lifetime expenditures, including house 
purchase and education; (3) to finance unexpected losses of income (precautionary saving); and 
(4) to smooth the availability of resources over time to maintain more stable consumption 
(consumption smoothing). While the assumption of an individual or a unitary household may be 
a convenient one, it overlooks the possibility that, in non-pooled savings households, there are 
gender differences in the relative strength of saving motives between men and women as 
individual savers. Moreover, it does not take into account that, in households that pool savings, 
the differences in saving motives of male and female household members are likely to bring 
about negotiation and bargaining which influence the rate of household savings.  
 B. Evidence from Research in Developed Countries 
 The literature on gender differences in saving behavior is sparse and has focused 
primarily on developed countries. That research has found significant differences in individual 
retirement savings and investment decisions by gender. For example, Sunden and Surette (1998) 
provide empirical evidence demonstrating that gender and marital status influence investment 
allocation decisions in the United States. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) examined the 
evidence on gender differences in risk aversion when an individual’s entire portfolio of assets is 
considered, using the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. They found that single women are 
more risk-averse than single men and married couples. As an individual’s wealth increases, the 
proportion held in risky assets was found to increase but for single women, the effect was 
significantly smaller than for single men and married couples. Using a wide range of variables 
that measure risk-taking, Palsson (1996), in a study of Swedish households, similarly finds 
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evidence that women are more risk-averse than men.  
A number of studies show that women are more conservative in their investment 
decisions than men. For example, Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996), looking at United States 
private pensions, find that women hold a much higher proportion of their portfolios in fixed 
assets than men. Bajtelsmit and VanderHei (1997) also find gender differences in pension 
decisions, with women significantly less likely to invest in employer stock and equities than 
men.6 Similarly, Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1996) examine the allocation patterns of federal 
government workers in the U.S. Thrift Savings Plan and find that women invest their pensions 
more conservatively than men. Looking at individual contributions to the 401(K) pension plan in 
the U.S., Hungerford (1999) shows that women contribute at a significantly higher rate than men 
to their plan.7  
These studies do not, however, explore why risk attitudes and savings behavior differ by 
gender. Drawing from an extensive literature in psychology, several studies in the field of 
psychometrics suggest that women’s attitude toward risk differs from men’s and demonstrate 
that gender is a powerful determinant of risk attitudes and judgments. For example, Flynn, 
Slovic, and Mertz (1994) and Barke, Jenkins-Smith, and Slovic (1997) find in their research on 
North American scientists that male respondents tend to judge risks as smaller and less 
problematic than do females.8 This finding is consistent with the previously discussed research 
                                                           
6 The study makes use of individual plan data on 20,000 employees in a single U.S. firm. 
7 The 401(K) plan is based on voluntary participation and workers determine how much to contribute to 
their pension accounts. In 1993, 401(K) plans accounted for 22 percent of all pension plans.  
8 Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994) find sizable differences in risk assessments between white males and 
females, which is not found between non-white males and females. This is explained by the fact that people of color, 
as white women, experience greater vulnerability than white males. 
 
 7
on gender differences in attitudes toward financial risk. 
  Bernasek (2000: 10) argues that such differences in perceived risk result from women’s 
different experiences and perceived vulnerability. Women on average experience greater 
vulnerability than men since they earn on average less than men, are more likely to care for 
children and elderly, are more likely to live in poverty, and are less likely to have health 
insurance and pension coverage in their jobs. They also have less political power than men. 
Women’s tendency to exhibit greater caution and be more averse to risk may then be a rational 
response to their greater vulnerability and lack of control over their lives. 
 C. Evidence from Research in Developing Countries 
The relevance of the findings of these studies for gendered saving behavior in developing 
economies is not clear. Structural conditions differ widely, and most saliently, industrialized 
economies have higher incomes and broader social safety nets that may substantially alter 
gendered saving behavior. To consider this issue further, we first turn our attention to research 
on household decision-making and resource allocation in developing countries. 
Research suggests that the decision-making process that determines resource allocation is 
influenced by the relative bargaining power of adults members of the household.9 A household 
member’s bargaining power in turn depends on the strength of that person’s outside options or 
“fallback position,” should a negotiated agreement fail. The strength of an individual’s 
bargaining power is determined by two sets of factors, which include:1) material (economic) 
factors internal to the household, and 2)  factors external to the household that influence material 
well-being. Material factors include owned assets, education, kinship, wages, and employment. 
                                                           
9 See, for example, Guyer (1988), Haddad and Hoddinott (1991), and Thomas  (1992). 
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External factors, which we refer to here as Gender Environmental Parameters (GEPs), include 
belief systems, political and legal structures such as property rights and divorce laws, and 
gendered employment practices  (Agarwal 1995; Blumberg 1988; Folbre 1997; Katz 1991a). The 
latter factors affect positions in household bargaining since they mediate the actual power that 
material resources will confer on an individual in the household.10 It follows that a relative 
improvement in any of the factors that affect an individual’s bargaining power should exert an 
influence on the allocation of household income among alternative uses. 
How do gender differences in bargaining power affect household decisions on the use 
and distribution of material resources in the household? The literature on intra-household 
resource allocation provides increasing evidence that prevailing gender relations and bargaining 
power among household members affect the types of expenditures households make, control 
over use of income, and other allocation decisions. In contrast to unitary models of household 
decision-making, a growing number of studies indicate that women’s and men’s allocational 
patterns differ significantly.  
More specifically, a considerable body of evidence indicates that women’s propensity to 
spend income under their control on family provisioning and children’s nutrition is greater than 
men’s (Blumberg 1988; Guyer 1988; Handa 1994; Katz 1991b; Kumar 1978; Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 1999; Roldan 1988; Thomas 1992). For example, Kumar’s (1978) study in Kerala, 
India indicates that a child’s nutritional level is positively correlated with the size of mother’s 
income as well as food inputs from subsistence farming, and the quality of available family-
                                                           
10 As Sen (1990) points out, the perception of power is the key link between the potential power conferred 
upon people by access to economic resources and their use of that power to bargain for outcomes consistent with 
their interests. 
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based child care. Significantly, children’s nutritional level does not increase in direct proportion 
to increases in paternal income. 
Likewise in the Beti population of Cameroon, Guyer (1988) found that women, in 
addition to their food production, spent fully 74 percent of their cash income on supplements to 
the family food supply, while men spent only an estimated 22 percent of their income on food. 
Overall, men supplied 33 percent of cash expenditures for food and other household items, while 
women contributed 67 percent. Similarly, using Brazilian data on 25,000 urban households, 
Thomas (1992) found that unearned income in the hands of the mother was estimated to have a 
larger impact on her family’s health than income attributed to the father.11 For child survival 
probabilities, the effect was almost 20 times greater. 
Other studies demonstrate that other sources of women’s bargaining power, including 
women’s education and assets, have a significant impact on household expenditure decisions and 
hence on children’s well-being. For example, Thomas and Chen (1993), using household survey 
data in the United States, Brazil and Ghana, find that the educational status of the mother has a 
larger effect on daughter’s height, while the education of the father has a larger effect on son’s 
height. Doss’s (1996) study of Ghanaian households, using data from 1991-92 Ghana Living 
Standards Survey, shows that the relative level of assets owned by women in urban households 
significantly affects household expenditure patterns. For urban households, a one percent 
increase in the share of assets held by women increases the budget share on food to 50.3 percent. 
                                                           
11  Evidence from developed economies also suggests that income controlled by women is spent differently 
than income controlled by men. For example, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1995) examine the impact of a shift in 
policy in the United Kingdom from a child tax allowance that was primarily realized as a tax credit in men’s 
paychecks to a child benefit scheme that accrued to women. They find that expenditures on women’s and children’s 
clothing increased relative to men’s clothing as a result of this change. See also Phipps’ and Burton’s (1998) study, 
using Canadian data.  
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Education expenses are found to be positively correlated with the percent of assets held by both 
urban and rural women, while alcohol, tobacco, and recreation are negatively correlated. 
Research on Guatemalan rural households (Katz 1991b) and Mexican urban households  
(Benería and Roldan 1988) highlights the link between labor allocation, employment and 
intrahousehold income, and expenditure allocation. Katz (1991b) finds that women in the 
Guatemalan highlands whose households maintain separate male and female income streams are 
reluctant to reduce their paid work even in the face of increasing demand for their labor time in 
other activities. This is because the non-pooled income arrangements enable women to have 
more income under their control and to allocate this income according to their interests. This 
suggests a positive correlation between a woman’s economic resources and her influence in 
household decisions such as expenditure allocation. Benería and Roldan (1988) find that, in non-
pooling households, labor allocation decisions have direct consequences for how much income 
will accrue to a given household member.  
In households that do pool their incomes, how do women use their economic resources 
(such as access to employment) in the negotiation process? The bargaining process may be 
implicit or explicit, with negotiating strategies shaped by the cultural context. Whatever those 
strategies might be, we may infer more generally from the work of Katz (1991a), Agarwal 
(1995), and others, that although earning income is not a sufficient condition for claiming control 
over its use, a person has a greater chance in having a claim over one’s own earnings. 
Safilios-Rothschild’s (1988) study of rural Honduran households, for example, shows 
that women’s ability to control income and influence decision-making is influenced by gender-
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associated income disparities. Women’s economic contributions are more often allowed to 
become visible and to lead to control of income when men have economic superiority over 
women. But when women’s income is crucial to household survival, women are less able to 
translate their economic contribution to higher bargaining power because of the threat to 
husbands’ resistance. Men perceive this as a threat to their masculinity.12  Similarly, in a study of 
women outworkers in Mexico City, Roldan (1988) finds that women’s access to individual 
income facilitates re-negotiation of the terms of marital interaction and is associated with greater 
decision-making power in some areas, including household allocational patterns. 
The discussion to this point has focused on how gender and bargaining power interact to 
influence expenditures within households. What if anything do these findings imply about the 
role of gender in influencing the distribution of household income between current expenditures 
and saving? This question has two implicit components. First, do women behave differently than 
do men in their allocation of income between saving and current expenditures? If so, will 
improvements in women’s bargaining power have any effect on the household’s saving rate? 
More succinctly, we may ask whether changes in sources of women’s bargaining power, 
particularly their wage earnings, affect the average propensity to save and whether this results in 
a discernible effect on the aggregate saving rate. 
D. Gendered Determinants of Saving Preferences  
Because the options and constraints that women face in developing economies differ 
from those of men, their saving behavior may also differ. One of the most important purposes of 
saving in developing economies is for consumption smoothing purposes (Deaton 1990). There 
                                                           
12  Kabeer (2000) provides similar evidence for Bangladeshi factory women, who tend to downplay the 
importance of their earnings for family well-being, fearful of threatening male dominance in the household, which 
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may be gender differences in responsiveness to this motive. Men who, by their position in the 
labor market, are more likely to be beneficiaries of social insurance policies may have less need 
to fall back on savings for consumption smoothing purposes.13 
Conversely, insofar as women are less able to rely on state-level programs when income 
flows are interrupted, they may have a greater incentive to save out of their discretionary income 
than men.14 Women may also achieve their consumption smoothing goal by maintaining ties to 
kinship networks which involves kin exchanges. Savings are required to finance these activities, 
which serve as a form of insurance or risk spreading to be tapped in economic hard times. 
The interplay of life cycle factors and social norms may also have differential effects on 
individual saving behaviors, though the net effect on willingness to save is unclear. Women are 
likely to outlive men, a factor that propels them to save at higher rates. Also, the need to raise 
funds for a dowry may lead women to save more than men of the same age cohort in those 
countries where the dowry system still prevails. Deolalikar and Rao (1998) show that dowry 
payments in India, which have been increasing in size and incidence in recent years, can amount 
to several years’ worth of household income.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
might then lead to women being forced to give up their paid jobs.  
13 This is because of men’s differential benefits from social protection programs, stemming from their 
greater representation in formal sector employment. The latter is more likely to provide unemployment insurance, 
disability and pension benefits, and health coverage than are informal sector or part-time jobs, where women tend to 
be over represented.  
14 In line with this argument, Callen and Thimann (1997) find evidence that the generosity of social 
security systems explains a portion of cross-country variations in saving in OECD countries, although they do not 
consider gender differences in assessing generosity. Further, Brenner, Dagenais, and Montmarquette (1994) provide 
evidence of a gendered link between uncertainty and aggregate saving in developed economies. They show that the 
increased probability of divorce caused saving rates in the United States to fall. The abrupt rise in divorce rates led, 
they argue, to women’s greater willingness to participate in the labor force, and to invest in education. It is worth 
noting, that although financial savings diminished, investment in education or human capital  rose. The extent to 
which these circumstances are applicable to semi-industrialized economies is, however, unclear. 
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In South Korea, where young women are the primary source of labor in export industries, 
Kim (1997) found that among their highest priorities in the decision of how to allocate earnings 
were the goals of saving for a dowry and to finance their siblings’ education. Women indicated 
that to achieve this goal, given their low salaries, they were compelled to skip meals, cut back on 
other necessities, and live in crowded conditions.  
On the other hand, young Taiwanese women are expected to pay their debts to families 
by remitting a large share of their factory earnings to parents, thus reducing their individual 
savings. The parents use their daughters’ wage remittances to finance their sons’ educations, 
with sons later relied on to support them in old age (Greenhalgh 1985). This family system, 
which socializes girls into filial piety and indebtedness, results in wide educational gaps between 
girls and boys, reducing women’s ability to save in the future. The effect on current saving is 
ambiguous, however, since it is not clear that daughters’ remittances to parents result in a change 
in average saving rates.    
By contrast, in Java, expectations that young factory women support their families are 
much weaker. Despite this, Wolf (1988) found that factory women she interviewed saved on 
average 30 percent of their income for use to redistribute to families in times of distress or to 
finance their own weddings. These studies suggest that cultural factors influence gendered non-
pooled savings behavior, and cross-country variations are likely to be important.  
Financial market conditions also interact with gender norms in influencing an 
individual’s saving behavior. The extent to which financial institutions provide both women and 
men access to and control over individual accounts without the spouse’s permission is likely to 
have a differential impact on men and women’s savings rate. For example, Bangladeshi women 
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are constrained from saving in large sums and in cash since this is likely to attract the attention 
of male household members who then take control of those savings. In these circumstances, 
women are more likely to save only in small quantities, for example, by reserving a handful of 
rice before cooking (Goetz and Gupta 1996).15   
Access to an informal savings program may also enable women to save money without 
other household members knowing the amount, thereby increasing control over the savings. As 
an example of this, Doss (1996) provides a study of women’s bargaining power in Ghanaian 
households where savings frequently take place through susu, an informal savings program. In a 
typical monthly susu plan for market women and petty traders, for example, each person 
contributes daily to the fund, and at the end of the month receives the lump sum of her savings, 
minus the charge of one day’s savings. One of the reasons that many individuals, especially 
women, participate in susu is that this provides a way to save money and to keep those savings 
within the individual’s control. Similarly, studies of informal savings associations in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa, such as chit clubs and ROSCAs, show that a substantial number of them are 
formed by women, especially those with independent sources of income. Many of these groups 
are all-female to prevent men from monopolizing the funds (Adams and Fitchett 1992).16  
Differences in responsibility for children’s well-being may also affect saving behavior, 
                                                           
15 An important point is that women may make different choices with regard to the form of saving than 
men, particularly when male household heads have greater control over income or have more experience in dealing 
with financial markets and institutions. It is likely that women in these circumstances will tend to save less in the 
form of financial assets (e.g., deposits), and will save more in the form of real assets such as gold, jewelry, and 
livestock, over which they have greater control. These assets, however, can be misinterpreted as current consumption 
expenses. 
16 Further, Gugerty (1999) finds that women in rural Kenya have a greater preference than men for 
participation in ROSCAs. In this case, their greater participation is explained by women’s stronger preference to use 
the savings for the eventual purchase of consumer durables for the household. 
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and the direction of this effect too is ambiguous. On the one hand, the household bargaining 
literature implies that women’s greater responsibility and willingness to invest in children’s 
well-being will result in an increase in expenditures on children, should women’s bargaining 
power increase. This implies a lower level of savings. On the other hand, women’s desire to 
smooth income to provide economic security for the family, especially for their children, may 
result in a higher saving rate as women’s bargaining power rises.  
The literature exploring the likely impact of children on household savings raises an 
important issue. Conventional wisdom suggests that children act as a substitute for retirement 
savings in many developing countries. Children help care for their elderly parents, particularly 
their widowed mothers, which can reduce the incentive to save. Deaton and Paxson (1997) find 
for Taiwan that if bequests to children are an important motive for saving, the presence of 
children may raise their parents’ saving throughout the life cycle. Alternatively, if parents—and 
and this may be more true for mothers—have strategic bequest motives, they may save more to 
accumulate assets so as to ensure their children’s loyalty and sense of obligation to the parent, 
particularly in their old age. 
Whatever the gender effect on saving propensities, economic and cultural factors 
generate differences in the capacity of women and men to save. On the economic side, although 
women’s labor force participation has been rising in many countries, and in some cases, the 
gender wage gap has been narrowing, women on average still have lower levels of wealth and 
earnings than men. This is partially the result of gendered labor market practices in which 
occupational segregation and discrimination lead to pay inequities with women frequently 
sequestered in low-wage occupations. Women’s lower levels of income have a double effect: 
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they result in fewer resources available for savings and investment (income level effect) and 
suggest a greater aversion for absolute risk (saving propensity effect).17  
Women’s access to and control over income can affect saving behavior in other ways. 
Papanek and Schwede (1988) in a Jakarta study show that women are more likely to participate 
in arisan, informal saving groups, if they are employed. Further, increases in women’s earnings 
raise the household’s income and can lead to an increase in saving once basic necessities are 
met. Equally important, higher relative income improves women’s ability to influence the 
amount of saving out of household income since their fallback position and thus bargaining 
power improve.  
Social and gender norms may also influence women’s ability to earn and to influence 
household saving. For example, a study of urban poor households in Honduras shows that the 
probability of husbands’ approval has a significant effect on the wife’s labor force participation 
(Fleck 1998). Further, purdah and other similar cultural practices which constrain women’s 
participation in and choice of income-earning activities, may also affect their ability to save.  
  In sum, women’s and men’s saving behavior may differ because of differences in the 
degree of economic vulnerability they face and because gender roles and norms cause their 
economic interests to diverge. This is likely to be the case, whether or not households pool 
savings. Further, household-pooled savings are influenced by decision-making patterns that 
depend on relative bargaining power between household members that interact with gendered 
differences in savings propensities. Gender differences in control over economic resources, 
                                                           
17 Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996) found that gender differences in investing and risk-taking can be 
attributed mainly to discrimination and differences in individual preferences. These influence risk aversion directly 
or through outcomes such as gender differences in wealth, income, and employment. 
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including access to outside income, may therefore be influential insofar as shifts in control may 
influence the balance of power within the household to affect saving decisions. 
  
III.  Role of Gender in Influencing Saving Behavior: An Analytical Framework 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, to formally specify the effects of gender 
on household saving rates and, by extension, aggregate savings, we present a simple analytical 
framework for both pooled and non-pooled savings households.18 More specifically, we examine 
why and how a change in women’s wage earnings relative to men’s may influence household 
savings. Gender differences in wage earnings have a double effect—the income level effect 
which increases household income and thereby the level of savings, and the saving propensity 
effect. It is the second effect that will be explored in this section. 
Due to lack of household-level saving data for developing countries and of studies on 
intrahousehold dynamics with regard to saving behavior, we do not have a priori information on 
which to base a model of saving behavior. We assume, therefore, that there exists a continuum of 
possible saving arrangements within households. For purposes of simplicity, we examine two 
possible (albeit extreme) cases, one whereby individuals make their own decision on how much 
to save out of their earned income, and the other where household members pool their savings.19 
To represent these two cases, we develop an individual saving behavior model for non-pooled 
savings households, and a Nash cooperative household bargaining model for pooled-savings 
                                                           
18 Aggregate household saving is the sum of the saving of all households, single-person and multi-person, 
in the economy.  
19 A more realistic but complicated case involves households that pool their income and negotiate the 
allocation of income to current expenditures versus savings. 
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households.20 From this, we derive the determinants of household saving, some of which can be 
quantified and are incorporated into an empirical model of aggregate saving.  
A. Individual or Non-Pooled Savings Model 
We assume that each income-earning individual in the household is an economic actor 
that makes her or his own decision on how much to save.21 In other words, total household 
savings is the sum of individual-determined level of savings. We first examine whether, for a 
given level of income, women are more likely to spend or save than men. Later, we extend the 
model to consider the effect of gender-based differences in income on household saving rates. 
The savings function can be written: 
 S i = a + bi Y i,      i = F, M     (1) 
where  S i is the level of saving for individual i, a is the level of autonomous saving, which does 
not depend on the level of income, bi is the marginal propensity to save, and Y i is individual 
income.22  
Rather than assume, as in standard economic models, that bi is gender-neutral, we explore 
the likelihood that women and men have different savings propensities, i.e., that .MF bb ≠  
The reasons for this difference, as discussed earlier, are varied. For illustrative purposes, and 
without loss of generality, we will focus on only three in this model. These are: a) differences in 
                                                           
20 Note that one cannot assume that if households pool their income and have unified budgets, they also 
necessarily pool their savings. In other words, income and savings arrangements may differ within a given household 
unit.  
21 The individual saving model presented here follows the work on decisions with uncertainty by Leland 
(1968) and Sandmo (1970). 
22 At low levels of income, especially below the minimum required subsistence level, the individual is 
likely to dissave or to borrow in which case a is negative. 
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perceived interest resulting from gender roles and norms (call this П), and b) differences in 
perceived risk resulting from their different experiences, earnings level and vulnerability (call 
this Ξ). The difference in perceived interest is reflected in the individual agency function while 
the difference is perceived risk is reflected in the degree of risk concerning future income, 
defined by the (subjective) probability distribution of future income f(Yi2 ) with mean ξ. We will 
explore this point later in the section. Consider the following, simplified individual objective 
function in a two-period model: 23  
                                               Β i = B( X it , L it ),            t = 1, 2    (2) 
where Β i refers to a person’s agency,24 X i is a vector of market goods consumed at period t and 
L i  is leisure time. Note that here, X i refers to consumption by individual i, and possibly others, 
such as children. Gender and social norms influence the person’s perceived range of interests by 
affecting her or his sense of obligation and perception of legitimate behavior. For example, 
women in India or Cameroon are likely to include children’s consumption in their X level. In the 
first period, X i1 is given by: 
    X i1 = Y i1 – S i1     (3) 
where Y i1 is income in the first period, assumed to be known with certainty and S i1  is saving.  
                                                           
23 A more complete model would include as an argument in the well-being function a vector of home 
production and services that go into social reproduction and maintenance. We recognize the crucial importance of 
non-market, home sector of the economy but for simplicity,  we ignore it in this and the following cooperative 
household bargaining model. 
24 Agency is a broader concept than “well-being” or “utility.”  While the latter is defined as an abstract 
measure of satisfaction, well-being is defined as the physical, social, and mental development of human capabilities 
obtained by means of access to and consumption of basic commodities (such as food, health care, education, and 
shelter), participation in activities, and access to some level of security and insurance during periods of emergency or 
difficult economic times. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Floro (1995). Agency, on the other hand, 
refers to the notion that a person who may have various goals and objectives other than the pursuit of his or her well-
being. Although there are obvious links between a person’s well-being and agency, they are not necessarily closely 
connected. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Sen (1990). 
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 Consumption of market goods in the second period is given by:  
                   X i2 = Y i2  + S i1 (1 + r)                          (4) 
  where Y2  is future income which is not known in period t = 1, and r is the nominal rate of   
 interest, assumed to be known. The individual’s beliefs about the level of future income can be 
 summarized in a subjective probability density function f (Yi2 ) with mean ξ. On the basis of this,  
we obtain the following expected objective function (in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense). 
Substituting (3) into (4), we can obtain: 
                  X i2 = Y i2  + ( Y i1 – X i1 )(1 + r)     (5) 
so that the expected objective function is: 
  E[Β i( X it , Lit )] =  ∫ B [ X i1 , Y i2  + ( Y i1 – X i1 )(1 + r), L it  ] f (Y i2 ) dY i2   (6) 
 where integration is over the range of Y i2. Maximizing X i2  with respect to consumption at t =1, 
we obtain the first order condition, 
                         D1 =  E[Β i1  – (1 + r) Β i 2 ] = 0    (7) 
and the second-order condition, 
                  D2 =  E[Β i11] – 2(1 + r ) Β i12 – (1 + r)2 E[Β i 22 ]  <  0. (8) 
 Differential access to education, gender bias in labor market hiring, promotion and pay 
as well as gender-based differences in asset ownership and access to other resources, can lead to 
differences in incomes earned by women and men. In particular, 
                                                  Y Ft   <   Y Mt               (9) 
If women and men’s perceived interests are assumed to be the same, the effect of an increase in 
income, say of Y i1, can be found by implicit differentiation of equation (7): 
∂ X i1 /∂ Y i1    =  – ( 1+ r) E[Β i 12  – ( 1+ r)  Β i22  ] / D2  >  0.       (10)  
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This implies that: 
Β i 12  – (1+ r)  Β i22    > 0,   E[Β i 12 – (1+ r) Β i22 ]  > 0    (11) 
  Note, however, that the sign of equation (10) cannot be determined a priori in the case 
where the perceived interests of men and women are assumed to differ; it is possible that even at 
lower levels of income, women spend more than men do as a result of sense of obligation or 
legitimate behavior such as spending for younger sibling’s education. On the other hand, women 
may spend less and save more if there is a socially-defined purpose such as a dowry. In the case, 
the sign of equation (11) will be ambiguous as well.  
 We next examine the effects of the differences in men and women’s probability density 
function of future income owing to a vector of gender differences in social, economic, and 
demographic factors that influence their perceived interest (Π) and perceived risk (Ξ) and hence, 
their perceived probability distribution of future income. As we shall see later, this has a direct 
impact on the saving decision in period t =1. 
 Women’s greater economic vulnerability, their principal role in household maintenance 
and family provisioning, and hence perceived risk and perceived interest will cause women’s 
probability distribution of Y2 to differ from that of men. This is demonstrated by two kinds of 
shifts in men’s probability distribution of Y2. One is an additive shift, θ, which is equivalent to an 
increase in the mean with all other moments constant. The other is a variance shift, γi, by which 
the distribution is more dispersed (or stretched) around zero. A higher dispersion in the 
probability distribution of future income, as in the case for women, is equivalent to a stretching 
of the distribution around a constant mean—that is, a combination of additive and variance 
parameter changes in men’s probability distribution. 
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For the sake of simplicity, let us examine the effect on present consumption of an 
increase in the perceived degree of risk concerning future income for one individual. Holding 
other factors constant, we then test whether an increase in the individual’s uncertainty leads to an 
increase or decrease in present consumption, and hence, a decrease or increase in present 
savings. Let the expected value of future income for an individual (we now drop the subscript i ) 
be written:  
             E [γY2   +   θ]     (12) 
where γ is the variance shift parameter and θ is the additive one. Because Y2   > 0, a variance 
shift around zero will increase the mean. This has to be counteracted by an additive shift in the 
negative direction in order for the expected value to remain constant. Differentiating (12), the 
requirement is that: 
   dE [γY2   +  θ]  =   E[Y2 dγ  +  dθ]  =  0,   (13) 
which implies:  
                    dθ/dγ = – E[Y2] = – ξ        (14) 
We can now substitute (12) into the first order condition (7), and then differentiate present 
consumption X1 with respect to γ, which yields: 
       (∂ X1 / ∂ γ)  =  – 1(1/D2) E [B12 – (1 + r) B22) (Y2  – ξ)]    <   0. (15) 
Equation (15) shows that an increase in perceived risk by women, manifested as an 
increased dispersion around future income, is likely to decrease present consumption and hence 
to increase present savings. (The proof of this result is set out in Appendix B). That is:  
 
∂ S1 / ∂ γ >  0.      
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  One implication of the results of this non-pooled household savings model is that 
individual saving rates are affected not only by the income level and the interest rate in a given 
time period, but also by the person’s perceived interests (Π) and perceived risks (Ξ). Insofar as 
women’s perceived interests and risks differ from men’s, they are likely to save at a different rate 
than men. This implies that an increase in women’s share of income is likely to affect household 
saving rates and, by consequence, aggregate saving rates through the perceived risk effect ( 
positive) and  the perceived interest effect (ambiguous).   
  Of course, in many cases, household savings are pooled, and the amount of savings out 
of income is likely to be determined as a result of a bargaining process between women and men. 
The model in the following section takes up this type of household saving pattern.  
 
B.  Nash Cooperative Household Bargaining in Pooled Saving Households 
We now consider a two-adult household unit which jointly decides how much savings to 
set aside. Specifically, saving decisions, as with expenditure allocations, are determined by the 
outcome of bargaining between female and male adult members. Saving, therefore, depends not 
only on the household’s total income, but also on which member earns it. Each household 
member makes choices about time and resource allocation that influence household well-being. 
In a given period, each member has the following simplified agency function: 
Β i = Β i( X , S i, L i),   i = F,  M      (17) 
where again X  is a vector of market goods, S is past saving and L is leisure time. Note that this is 
 a one-period model, with S an argument in the objective function, under the assumption that 
well-being today is determined not only by current access to market goods and leisure, but also 
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by how much one is able to put aside as a precautionary measure.  
 Individual savings are determined by current money income Y, the interest rate r, and a 
vector of gender-differentiated variables Ω that reflect the individual’s perceptions of required 
future income needs and stability of income sources, such as owned assets, life expectancy, 
bequests to children, and family law, and can be written:   
S i = S i (Y i, r, Ωi)                   (18) 
Measuring savings proportionate to income, we do not have any evidence a priori to indicate 
whether the average female propensity to save (SF /YF) is significantly different than men’s  
(SM /YM). The earlier discussion suggests, however, the possibility that propensities differ, even if 
income is controlled for, owing to gender differences in the vector of exogenous factors Ω. 
If bargaining between women and men breaks down and there is no cooperation, they 
face the following time and income constraints in a given time period: 
        
iii TL =Λ+      (19) 
 and   
==+Λ YQw iii  pX + S i ,            (20) 
          
where Λ is paid labor time, T is total waking hours per day (excluding  time spent in home 
production and personal care), w is the market wage rate, Q is non-wage income from assets, 
including past savings, and p is a vector of market good prices. 
The decision on whether or not to cooperate depends on the net gain or loss that 
cooperation confers to each individual.25 To specify the net gains or loss from cooperation, we 
write indirect objective functions for women and men which indicate their "threat points" gained 
                                                           
25 The nature of the net loss (or gains) from cooperation governs the bargaining process and strongly 
influences the outcome. It reflects that person’s vulnerability or strength in “bargaining,” as Sen (1990: 135) puts it.  
 
 
 25
independent of cooperation, as: 
                         V i = V i ( w i, p  , Q i,  α ).                                        (21) 
The V’s in (20) are influenced by the individual's market wage, prices, assets (including past 
savings), and a vector of gender environmental parameters (GEPs) α.26   
Women and men choose to cooperate if Bi – Vi > 0, that is, if there are gains to 
cooperation. In the event of cooperation, the household maximizes a joint welfare function:    
               N = [B F  – V F]ψ [B M – V M] 1-ψ ,        0 < ψ < 1  (22) 
where the parameter ψ reflects female "voice" or bargaining power, and this acquires the value 
of 0 where there is patriarchal dominance and 0.5 when household decision-making is 
characterized by equal bargaining power. Households maximize the joint well-being function, 
subject to household income and time constraints, derived from combining (19) - (20) or: 
 p X + S F + S M = wF ΛF  + wM ΛM + QF + QM .              (23) 
 A set of demand functions for the vector of X’s, S’s, and L's can be derived from the 
constrained maximization problem as follows: 
X* = X (p, wi, Qi, r, Ω i, α , ψ )      (24) 
Si* = Si (p, wi, Qi, r, Ω i, α, ψ)      (25) 
Li* = Li (p, wi, Qi, r, Ω i, α ,ψ)       (26) 
Note that demand functions depend not only on prices and income but also on GEPs and the 
                                                           
26 As noted earlier, GEPs influence the individual’s fallback position, should cooperation fail. These 
include employment and other income-earning opportunities, divorce laws, and access to social support systems. 
Note that the important distinction between  Ω and  α is that the former refers to external factors affecting future 
social and economic well-being, and the latter refers to those influencing current well-being. This does not preclude 
that some elements of vector Ω may be common to α. 
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person’s individual bargaining power.    
Using the above frameworks, in this paper we jointly test two propositions. We test 
whether women and men have different preferences with regard to saving, as suggested by the 
individual savings behavior model. Second, we test, from equation (25), whether a shift in 
women’s bargaining power in a pooled-savings household influences the rate of saving out of 
household income, and hence aggregate saving. Note that if the first proposition does not hold, 
then shifts in female bargaining power that raise ψ will not affect household saving rates. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis of  Aggregate Saving 
The theoretical models outlined in equations (1) - (26) provide the framework for an 
empirical model of the determinants of household saving rates. The first model indicates why 
women’s saving propensities may differ from men’s. It suggests that the effect of women’s share 
of income (or total wage bill) on household saving in the case of non-pooled savings households 
depends on the relative strength of the positive perceived risk effect and the ambiguous 
perceived interest effect. The second model shows how factors that affect women’s relative 
bargaining power may influence saving rates in pooled-savings household. In the empirical 
analysis that follows, we frame our discussion around these two cases.27  Before proceeding, 
however, it is useful to specify the determinants of  “voice” or female bargaining power, ψ, 
described in the Nash cooperative bargaining model. As noted, determinants of female 
                                                           
27 As will be clear below, there is overlap in the factors that raise women’s bargaining power in pooled 
savings households and those that exert a positive effect on women’s relative income in non-pooled savings 
households. If, in both cases, overall, women tend to save more than men, then women’s share of the total wage bill 
will have a positive effect on the aggregate saving rate. The reverse will hold if, overall, women save less than men 
as a percentage of income. 
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bargaining power have generally been related to women’s control over resources, such as assets. 
The most commonly used measures are women's share of income and assets at marriage 
including women's educational attainment or human capital  relative to men's. Proxies for 
women’s fallback position in terms of income (call this female relative earnings or FY), 
therefore, are required for estimation of empirical models. One possibility is the economy-wide 
or aggregate female share of the total wage (FSHW), measured as the ratio of average female 
earnings to the sum of average female and male earnings or:28  
FSHW = [WF /(WF + WM )] 
where WF   and WM are average female and male earnings, respectively. An alternative measure 
of income earning abilities is women’s share of the wage bill (WSH), measured as the ratio of 
average female to male wages multiplied by women’s share of employment or: 
WSH = RW * ρ  
where RW = WF /WM , and ρ is women’s share of manufacturing jobs. This measure takes into 
account not only relative wages but also women’s access to jobs.29 An increase in the size of 
each of these variables is expected to produce, on one hand, a positive effect on female 
bargaining power in the case of pooled-saving households. On the other hand, it has an 
ambiguous effect on the level of present consumption to the extent that women have different 
perceived interests than men.  
With regard to assets and resources at marriage, a commonly used measure is the gap 
                                                           
28 There are, of course, numerous alternative ways to measure gender wage differences, such as [Ln (WM ) –
Ln (WF])]. Experimentation with other measures provided similar results in the empirical analysis. 
29 Because we are using aggregate rather than micro-level data, the two variables that we identify as 
exogenous measures of household bargaining power (FSHW and WSH) might also be considered to be GEPs, 
leading to some overlap of ψ and α in the empirical analysis.  
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between male and female educational attainment or human capital (DHK) since this reflects 
gender differences in access to potential income and a sense of personal efficacy.30 A reduced 
form equation for the determinants of female bargaining power can be written as: 
                 (+)    (–) 
 ψ = ψ  (FY, DHK)      (27) 
where DHK is measured as HKM – HKF or the difference between men’s and women’s  
educational attainment. Hypothesized signs are noted above the variables. 
We now want to test whether increases in women’s share of discretionary income and 
bargaining power influence household saving rates. We do this, using aggregate data, and 
controlling for other factors that may affect saving propensities. Modifying equation (25) to 
represent savings as a share of income, the equation to be estimated is:31    
            qj =  α j  + β1j PCY + β2j ADR + β3j FY  + β4j  DHK  + φj σj + εj   (28) 
qj   is saving as a share of income; 
PCY   is per capita income; 
ADR  is the age dependency ratio; 
FY  relative female/male income measure 
                                                           
30 It may be questioned whether in fact education affects women’s bargaining power within the household 
in a way not already captured by income. A few studies such as King (1990) explore the relationship between 
education and decisionmaking power within the household. King proposes that when the educational gap between 
husband and wife is wide, the wife’s role in decisionmaking is limited. An increasing number of studies show that 
education can alter  women’s self-confidence, self-esteem and notions about their roles in society but the impact of 
education is mitigated by a number of social and cultural variables (Archaya and Bennett 1981,  Alo and Adjibeng-
Asem 1988 and Floro and Wolf 1990). Nonetheless, the availability of employment is perceived to be  a necessary 
ingredient that interacts with the skills and attitude changes produced by education , leading to  increased 
decisionmaking role of women.., Hence, if employment opportunities are greater for more educated workers, again 
women’s bargaining power improves as their educational attainment rises. 
 
31 Unfortunately, we lack data on Q (non-wage income) and the full array of GEPs, which may lead to 
omitted variable bias. Nor do we have information that would allow us to distinguish between female and male rates 
of return on assets (r). Inflation and interest rates in equation (25) do not show up in equation (28) but are added as 
control variables to the basic model sequentially, as is shown below. The Ω from equation (25) represents the factors 
that may influence women to save at a different rate than men, given different expectations about future income. If 
women’s and men’s Ω’s differ, we would expect them to have differing saving propensities as shown in the non-
pooled savings model. We do not, however, have data on Ω. 
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σj  is a vector of country dummies;    
εj  is the error term; and 
αj, β1j, β2j, β3j, β4 j, and φj are parameters to be estimated. 
In particular, we test here for the determinants of saving as a share of household income, 
or qS = S/Y. We focus on the effects of relative female bargaining power which influence saving 
rates in pooled-savings households. Income and age dependency ratios are controlled for, under 
the assumption that saving rates are influenced in Keynesian fashion by the level of income as 
well as by life cycle factors. The remaining variables test for the effect of female relative income 
and, by consequence, bargaining power on saving rates. If β3j = β4j = 0, either female and male 
propensities to save are identical, and/or households may be unitary decision makers. 
Conversely, if β3 ≠ β4 j ≠ 0, then saving propensities differ and changes in female bargaining 
power influence household saving rates. Note that we do not have data that allow us to 
distinguish between non-pooled savings versus pooled-savings households. We therefore cannot 
discern the extent to which whether female relative income and education variables improve 
ability to save, or bargaining power within the household.  
C. Specification of the Aggregate Saving Model  
The empirical model we test uses cross-country time-series data. Absence of reliable 
cross-country household-level data on saving, however, requires that we use aggregate data 
sources. We therefore use the domestic saving rate, obtained from national income accounts, 
which is comprised of household saving, business saving, and government saving as a share of 
GDP. In order to test an aggregate saving model, we must control for additional factors 
(discussed in Section II and in greater detail in Appendix A) that influence aggregate saving.   
The first model (Model I) adopts the absolute income approach and is equivalent to the 
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household model in equation (28):32 
           DSRit  = αo + α1FYit  + α2  DHKit + α3  ADRit + α4 PCYit  +  θit                         (29)  
where DSR is the domestic savings rate as a percent of GDP, FY is a relative income measure to 
capture female bargaining power, perceived risks and interests, i is country, t is time, and θ is the 
random error. (For a complete listing of all variables and their codes, see Appendix C). We test 
three gender versions of this and subsequent models, using the following measures of FY: (1) 
female share of the wage (FSHW); (2) a decomposition of the female share of the wage bill, or 
the relative female/male wage (RW) and the female share of employment (ρ); and (3) the female 
share of the wage bill (WSH). 
The second model takes into account life-cycle influences on savings. Here, saving 
behavior is assumed to depend positively on the growth rate of GDP, which can be decomposed 
into the growth rate of per capita income (PCY1) and the population growth rate (POP1). We test 
both versions, or Model IIa and IIb, respectively as follows: 
            DSRit  = βo + β1 FY it +  β2 DHKit  + β3 ADR it +  β4 RGDP1it  +  β5 PCYit +  εit       (30a) 
   DSRit  = ζo + ζ1 FY it +  ζ2 DHKit  + ζ3 ADR it +  ζ4  PCY1it  + ζ5  POP1it  +  
  ζ6 PCYit + φit                                  (30b) 
 
The third model expands on Models I and II, incorporating factors that influence the 
willingness to save. Model IIIa includes a measure of the real interest rate (RIR), which should 
induce households to save more if the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Also, the 
degree of financial development, measured as money and quasi money as a share GDP (M2) is 
                                                           
32 Some studies include a measure of income squared (PCYSQ) to take account of non-linearities. We do 
not find evidence of non-linearities in our sample, and therefore omit PCYSQ. (See the next section on this point).  
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employed. Inflation (INF) which acts as a tax on savings and therefore is expected to have a 
negative sign, is included in the model. Tax revenue as a share of GDP is incorporated 
(TAXREV) to capture the effect of government saving and taxation on saving. Finally, the 
natural logarithm of the terms of trade index (TOT) is included, and is assumed to have a 
positive effect on saving. Model IIIa is: 
DSRit = δo +δ1 FYit + δ2 DHKit + δ3 ADRit + δ4 PCYit   + δ5 RIRit  + δ6  M2it + δ7 INFit   
 + δ8 TAXREVit   +  δ9 TOTit  + ηit             (31a) 
 
Finally, Model IIIb augments the life-cycle model and, in addition,  includes the same 
willingness-to-save variables used in Model IIIa or:  
 DSRit = γ0 + γ1 FYit + γ2 DHKit + γ3 ADRit + γ4 PCY1it + γ5 RIRit+ γ6 INFit + γ7 M2it 
 + γ8 TAXREVit   + γ9 TOTit + γ10 RGDP1it  + υit               (31b) 
 
V. Econometric Tests and Results 
The sample is comprised of a set of semi-industrialized countries for which gender-
disaggregated wage data are available. The sample was selected from middle-income countries 
as defined by the World Development Report 1998. Future research might usefully expand this 
data set to include industrialized countries. At this juncture, however, our goal was to examine 
behavior in countries that were broadly similar in stage of development. The country sample is 
provided in Appendix D.   
  A. The Data 
The domestic savings rate, as noted above, is measured as a ratio to GDP. GDP is 
measured in 1985 prices and from this, growth rates are calculated for the sample countries. Per 
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capita income data are from the PENN World Tables and are measured in international prices. 
The education variables are from Barro and Lee (1996), and DHK is measured as the difference 
in average years of secondary education attained by males and females 15 and older.33 The 
remaining macro-level variables, described above, are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the IMF and are measured in a straightforward manner.  
Wage and employment data are for the manufacturing sector only and are from the 
International Labor Organization (various years). With regard to the wage data, maximum 
coverage is from 1975-95, with many countries having shorter coverage. Manufacturing sector 
employment data are used rather than economy-wide data since coverage for the latter is not as 
broad, and several countries would have dropped out of the sample. 
Some cautions about the data should be noted. First, while the broadest period of analysis 
is 1975-95, data coverage varies, resulting in variations in sample sizes and thus unbalanced 
panels.34 Second, in most cases, the earnings data are corrected for hours worked, but some are 
not. Further, these data take into account only women’s and men’s formal employment and wage 
earnings in the manufacturing sector, serving only as proxies for economy-wide earnings.35 
There are two reasons this may not be cause for significant worry. First, the panel data 
estimations capture variation over time, and sectoral gender wage gaps may trend in a similar 
fashion. Second, any random measurement error in these variables tends to have a downward 
                                                           
33 Education was alternatively measured as total years of educational attainment by sex. Results, available 
upon request, are similar to those obtained using years of secondary education. 
34 Hussein and Thirlwall (1999) note, however, that variation in the sample size becomes a useful test of  
robustness, depending on whether significance of key variables changes as sample size changes. 
35 Consequently, we make the implicit assumption that trends in FY in the manufacturing sector track those 
in other sectors of the economy. 
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bias on their coefficients. Therefore any evidence that gender is a significant factor influencing 
saving rates may actually be understated. 
A third note of caution relates to the aggregate saving data which often have problems of 
consistency and reliability. Since gross domestic data is derived from national income accounts, 
one may expect measurement errors due to inaccuracies in both investment and balance-of- 
payments data, producing a downward bias on coefficients as well. As Fry (1995) notes, the 
caveats regarding data inaccuracies need not necessarily lead to misleading econometric results, 
provided that the saving data biases are constant over time and the errors are random. In 
addition, the use of pooled time-series data, which yields a large number of observations, permits 
behavioral relationships to be detected, even though non-trivial random errors in the data may 
exist. 
Finally, it may be difficult to disentangle the separate effects on saving of the gender 
education gap (DHK) and earnings shares (FY) on saving since these variables are likely to be 
collinear. Table 1 provides a correlation matrix of the relevant variables. While there is some 
evidence of multicollinearity between these variables, education and relative income variables 
are not perfect substitutes. This is not surprising since substantial evidence indicates that wage 
payments in a number of the countries studied diverge from measured indicators of productivity, 
such as education, due to discrimination in labor markets (Behrman and Zhang 1995; Birdsall 
and Behrman 1991; Horton 1996; Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1992). Further, educational 
differences may have implications for men’s and women’s outside options in the marriage 
market while wages reflect chances in the labor market. We therefore chose to include both 
variables. 
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B. Characteristics of Sample Data 
Figures 1 and 2 present time series data of the gender variables used in this analysis for 
selected countries. The data exhibit substantial variation both across countries and over time in 
women’s share of the wage and the wage bill. Given this, if there are detectable differences in 
saving propensities by gender, we would anticipate a significant effect of the gender distribution 
of wages (or the wage bill) on aggregate saving. Table 2 gives summary data on the variables 
used in the econometric analysis, averaged for the period 1975-95. Figure 3 provides a look at 
the relationship between the dependent variable, the domestic savings rate (DSR), and the level 
of per capita income against DSR. The data exhibit a positive relationship, but indicate little 
evidence of non-linearities. 
 C. Econometric Results 
The regressions are conducted with panel data to capture the effect of changes in 
variables within countries over to time to account for time-varying country-specific effects. 
Regressions are estimated using a two-way error components model. The basic model can be 
summarized as: 
Yit =  α  + Xit β + υ it  
where the error term υit has three components: 
υit = μi + λt + ε it.  
Here μ i captures the country specific-effects while λ t represents time-varying effects. Country 
(fixed) effects control for unobserved time-invariant differences that might affect saving. 
Several issues need to be considered in estimation: stationarity, heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and endogeneity. In this analysis, many of the variables are expressed as ratios, 
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and are thus stationary in the long run. Two exceptions are TOT and INF which are transformed 
into first differences. Heteroskedasticity problems are frequently encountered with cross-
sectional data, and therefore our regressions use GLS, with cross-sectional weights derived from 
the residual cross-sectional standard deviations. While this procedure corrects for 
heteroskedasticity across countries, a more general form is necessary to allow variances within a 
cross section to vary over time. This was done by obtaining standard errors in accordance with 
White's variance-covariance matrix in all regressions. We corrected for autocorrelation using an 
autoregressive process modeled as an AR(1) with a common country coefficient. In separate 
regressions, reported in Appendix E, the lagged dependent variable was included as a regressor. 
This reflects that adjustment may take time, and also addresses the autocorrelation problem.  
Some right-hand side variables might potentially be endogenous. In particular, the gender 
variables may be simultaneously determined by the growth rate of GDP. To check for this, 
Hausmann tests were run on Models I-III with the results indicating no evidence of endogeneity 
for either gender variable.36  
Table 3 summarizes the results obtained from the generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimates of  Model 1. Equation 1 estimates the basic absolute income model, which is the same 
as the household model in equation (28). The coefficient on FSHW is positive and significant, 
indicating that a higher relative wage for women raises the aggregate saving rate. As expected 
the education gap has a negative sign, indicating that the wider the gap between male and female 
secondary educational attainment, the lower the aggregate saving rate. The age dependency ratio 
                                                           
36 This was done by regressing DSR on all independent variables (the “constrained” model). The “suspect” 
variable (each of the gender variables) was then regressed on all exogenous variables. The resulting fitted values 
were then added to the constrained model. T-tests of the significance of that variable did not support the hypothesis 
of endogeneity of gender variables.  
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coefficient is negative as would be expected, but is insignificant. Finally, the level of per capita 
income is positive and significant. In equation 2, we decompose the female share of the wage bill 
into two parts, RW, the relative female/male wage, and ρ, the female share of employment. Each 
of these variables is positive and significant. In this case, DHK becomes insignificant, but 
coefficients on the remaining variables are stable. Finally, equation 3 uses the female share of 
the wage bill, and this is also positive and significant. 
The results of estimating the Life Cycle Model (Model II) are shown in Table 4. For 
Model IIa, which includes the growth rate of GDP as an explanatory variable, in equations 1 and 
2, the gender income variables are positive and significant, while in equation 3, the female share 
of the wage bill is positive but insignificant. PCY is robust to this alternative specification, while 
again, DHK is only significant and negative in equation 1. RGDP1 is positive and significant in 
equation 1, but changes sign in equation 2, and is insignificant in equation 3. Model IIb replaces 
RGDP1 with POP1 and PCY1, and gives results shown in equations  4-6. The gender income 
variables and PCY are robust to this alternative specification, while POP1 is negative as would 
be expected and PCY1 performs perversely or is insignificant. 
Table 5 provides the results of testing modified versions of Models I and II. In Model 
IIIa, we add financial and macroeconomic variables. In equation 1, the coefficient on FSHW is 
positive and significant but is reduced in size by about one half from Models I and II. PCY 
continues to perform robustly. All of the financial and macroeconomic variables with the 
exception of the terms of trade variable are significant. Interestingly, the sign on the real interest 
rate variable is negative, a finding that is consistent with Keynesian and structuralist 
perspectives. The robustness of the FSHW variable as the sample size changes is notable. DHK, 
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however, changes sign and continues to be insignificant in all versions of Model III. The female 
share of the wage bill (WSH) does not, however, perform so robustly, nor do its decomposed 
components (equations 2 and 3). Model IIIb adds RGDP1 as a life cycle variable. The FSHW 
variable as well as the financial and macroeconomic variables are again robust, but RGDP1 is 
insignificant. Finally, in equations 5 and 6, again the decomposed FSHW and the WSH are 
insignificant, and in one case, change signs. Also, the low Durbin-Watson statistic makes the 
estimates in this equation unreliable.37 
In sum, two variables perform robustly in all three models in this analysis, PCY and 
FSHW. In Models I and II, WSH as well as its decomposed parts also performed as predicted by 
the household bargaining model. The insight offered by the results obtained from decomposing 
the wage share is that even if relative wages remain constant, women’s greater access to 
employment improves their outside options sufficiently to raise bargaining power and influence 
saving rates. 
The education variable performed less robustly than the income variables, although this 
may be in part explained by multicollinearity among these variables. (Running regressions with 
the education variable as the only bargaining power variable yielded slightly more consistently 
significant negative coefficients). Table 6 summarizes the econometric results obtained of the 
gender bargaining power variables.  
The preliminary evidence on the role of gender in determining aggregate saving suggests 
measures of women’s access to outside income raises the aggregate saving rate. The size of the 
effect is not insignificant. Though it varies in our estimates, consider, for example, the results 
                                                           
37 Similar results were obtained using PCY1 and POP1 in place of RGDP1. 
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given in Table 4. There we see that a one percentage point increase in women’s share of the 
wage raises aggregate saving by roughly a quarter percentage point. Similarly, a percentage 
point increase in women’s share of income raises aggregate saving by about one sixth of a 
percentage point. 
These results are suggestive of differential savings behavior at the household level, with 
women’s propensity to save higher than that of males at least for this set of countries. These 
results are also consistent with a growing body of research that suggests that gender is an 
important macroeconomic variable, and links this to micro-level, household behavior. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper explores the role that gender plays in influencing aggregate saving rates for a 
set of semi-industrialized countries. These countries have increasingly relied on female labor in 
their export manufacturing sectors. A question of interest is whether increases in women’s wages 
relative to men’s as well as increases in their share of income have affected aggregate saving 
rates. Presupposed in this question is that women and men have differing propensities to save 
due to variations in perceived risks and interests and in gender-related external factors that affect 
savings behavior.  
This paper is exploratory in the sense that little prior evidence existed to indicate whether 
higher relative wages and income for women will raise or lower saving rates—whether the effect 
will be so negligible as to be undetectable. Preliminary evidence provided here using a panel 
data set is consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in women’s discretionary income and 
bargaining power raises household saving and therefore aggregate saving rates. These results are 
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of interest in that they imply an aggregate role for micro-level gender relations at the household 
level. A deeper understanding of the determinants of saving rates at the household level is 
especially useful in planning for savings mobilization and in the formulation of financial and 
investment policies. 
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